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MCCULLOCH V. MADISON:  JOHN MARSHALL’S 
EFFORT TO BURY MADISONIAN FEDERALISM 
Kurt Lash* 
In his engaging and provocative new book, The Spirit of the 
Constitution: John Marshall and the 200-Year Odyssey of 
McCulloch v. Maryland, David S. Schwartz challenges McCul-
loch’s canonical status as a foundation stone in the building of 
American constitutional law.  According to Schwartz, the for-
tunes of McCulloch ebbed and flowed depending on the politics 
of the day and the ideological commitments of Supreme Court 
justices.  Judicial reliance on the case might disappear for a gen-
eration only to suddenly reappear in the next.  If McCulloch v. 
Maryland enjoys pride of place in contemporary courses on con-
stitutional law, Schwartz argues, then this is due more to person-
alities and institutions of the early twentieth century than it is to 
any deeply rooted historical consensus about the importance of 
Marshall’s opinion.  Nor, Schwartz insists, should we read Mar-
shall’s opinion on the Second Bank of the United States as em-
bracing a theory of “aggressive nationalism” and the unlimited 
expansion of implied congressional power.  That might be a cor-
rect reading of the Constitution (Schwartz is never completely 
clear on this particular point), but Marshall himself muddied the 
issue with ambiguous language—language that left the door open 
to later more restrictive interpretations of federal power.  The fact 
that scholars and judges continue to treat McCulloch as a founda-
tional statement of constitutional power reflects a triumph of 
twentieth century mythology—a triumph triply problematic in 
that it (1) is historically misleading, (2) does not embrace a fully 
robust understanding of implied federal power (which Schwartz 
presumably prefers), and (3) relies upon the same history-centric 
 * E. Claiborne Robins Distinguished Professor of Law, University of
Richmond School of Law. 
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values as “conservative originalism” (which Schwartz presuma-
bly rejects).   
In short, Schwartz comes not to praise the mythological 
McCulloch, but to bury it.  Readers who complete this deep dive 
into two hundred years of cultural and judicial references to 
McCulloch will probably be persuaded by Schwartz’s general ar-
guments: McColloch does contain ambiguous and at times seem-
ingly contradictory language, Marshall’s opinion has been 
viewed in different ways at different times, and it is only recently 
that the case has come to occupy its status as a canonical state-
ment of congressional authority.  As Bruce Ackerman pointed out 
years ago, the New Deal Court embraced John Marshall and 
McCulloch in order to add a patina of original understanding to 
its startling restructuring of federal power.  The New Deal Su-
preme Court, in other words, made a myth of McCulloch. 
But although Schwartz challenges the post-New Deal myth 
of McCulloch, his historical account remains substantially bound 
to that same myth.  McCulloch-as-myth legitimates the modern 
Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of implied federal 
power.  The myth treats the case as important because of its par-
agraphs addressing the implied powers of Congress.  Schwartz 
accepts the myth’s focus on this particular issue even as he chal-
lenges its veracity.  The historical journey recounted in his book 
focuses on the issue of implied federal power: from disputes over 
internal improvements and slavery to the modern debates over the 
scope of the administrative state.  The journey is fascinating, but 
this almost single-minded focus on implied power has the effect 
of further entrenching the myth’s insistence that McCulloch is im-
portant because of its discussion of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  No doubt, this is the central importance of McCulloch 
today.  But this was not the central importance of Marshall’s opin-
ion in 1819.  When John Marshall drafted McCulloch, he had 
more on his mind than justifying internal improvements, and 
much more than simply validating the existence of the Second 
Bank of the United States.  McCulloch v. Maryland represents 
Marshall’s effort to redefine the nature of the Constitution itself.  
It is easy to miss Marshall’s ambitious effort.  Indeed, Marshall 
likely wanted readers to initially miss the more radical implica-
tions of his opinion.  He was so successful at masking his goal 
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that, to this very day, the most historically significant paragraphs 
of the opinion are rarely noticed, much less given the attention 
they deserve.  
Marshall begins his constitutional analysis in McCulloch by 
addressing what he characterizes as an odd and rather unim-
portant point raised by Maryland’s lawyers: 
In discussing this question, the counsel for the state of Mar-
yland have deemed it of some importance, in the construc-
tion of the constitution, to consider that instrument, not as 
emanating from the people, but as the act of sovereign and 
independent states.1 
Here, John Marshall feigns ignorance.  In fact, Marshall and 
every other student of the American Constitution in 1819 knew 
exactly why Maryland’s counsel “deemed it of some importance” 
to make this particular point about the origins of the Constitution.  
If, as Maryland argued, the Constitution “emanated” from the still 
sovereign people of the several states, then whatever power those 
people delegated away ought to be strictly construed.  This was 
not just Maryland’s opinion.  This was the central interpretive 
principle announced in the most influential constitutional treatise 
of the day, St. George Tucker’s “View of the Constitution.”2  
An influential Virginia judge and a professor of law at the 
College of William and Mary, St. George Tucker published “A 
View of the Constitution” in 1803.  The very first constitutional 
treatise, Tucker’s “View” was heavily influenced by the constitu-
tional theories of James Madison and the Federalist Papers.  Re-
peatedly citing Madison’s work, Tucker described the Constitu-
tion as a “compact freely, voluntarily, and solemnly entered into 
by the several states, and ratified by the people thereof.”3  This 
was not the “compact theory” eventually espoused by John C. 
Calhoun. Tucker’s theory of the constitutional compact echoed 
James Madison’s dual federalism theories declared in the Virginia 
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 402 (1819).
2. St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND 
LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, app. Note D passim (St. George Tucker ed., Lawbook Exch. 
1996) (1803). 
3. Id. at 155.
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Resolution, Madison’s Report of 1800, and originally introduced 
in the Federalist Papers.  Quoting Madison’s Federalist 39, for 
example, Tucker repeats Madison’s assurance to the ratifiers that 
adopting the Constitution would not result in a “consolidated gov-
ernment”:  
[A]lthough the constitution would be founded on the assent
and ratification of the people of America, yet that assent and
ratification was to be given by the people, not as individuals
composing one entire nation; but as composing the distinct
and independent states, to which they respectively belong.  It
is to be the assent and ratification of the several states, de-
rived from the supreme authority in each state, the authority
of the people themselves.  The, act, therefore establishing the
constitution, will not, said they, “be a national but a federal
act. That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these
terms are understood by the objectors, the act of the people,
as forming so many independent states, not as forming one
aggregate nation.4
The argument that the Constitution was a “federal” act of the 
people in the several states, and not the act of a single “aggregate” 
people, had significant implications for the proper interpretation 
of delegated powers.  Citing the theories of treaty interpretation 
presented in Emmerich De Vattel’s Law of Nations (1758), 
Tucker explained that when a sovereign delegates away power in 
a treaty or compact, they are presumed to have delegated away no 
more power than is absolutely necessary.  All such delegations of 
sovereign authority, therefore, must be “strictly construed.”5  
In other words, according to Madison and Tucker, the nature 
and scope of constitutionally delegated federal power must be de-
fined according to the nature of the Constitution, and the nature 
of the Constitution is determined by the manner by which it came 
into being.  As a compact entered into by the sovereign peoples 
of the several states, the delegations of power in that compact 
must be narrowly construed on the presumption that the people in 
the states would not have delegated away their own independent 
existence.  Any interpretation of delegated power which threat-
ened to create a single “consolidated government” was 
4. Id. at 146.
5. Id. at 151.
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presumptively incorrect given the interpretive mandate to pre-
serve the remnant sovereign independence of the states. 
Tucker’s rule of strict construction is a distinctly federalist 
rule of construction.  The rule comes into play whenever an ex-
pansive interpretation of federal power threatens the retained 
powers and rights of the people in the several states.  As Tucker 
puts it, the Constitution “is to be construed strictly, in all cases 
where the antecedent rights of a state may be drawn in question.”6  
Such a rule might come into play, for example, if Congress tries 
to grant a corporate charter (a common state practice), but it might 
not come into play if the President tries to dismiss a member of 
his cabinet without Congress’s approval.  Similarly, the rule 
might apply if Congress tries to regulate state soil for “internal 
improvements,” but it might not apply if the President wants to 
sign a treaty with France gaining soil for future states (the power 
to make treaties with foreign nations being expressly denied to 
the states).  Finally, since the Constitution expressly prohibits the 
states from using anything but gold and silver coil as legal tender, 
determining whether Congress may issue paper money would not 
trigger Tucker’s rule of strict construction. 
Tucker’s “View of the Constitution” was the most influential 
commentary on the Constitution published prior to Joseph Story’s 
1833 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION.  One of the reasons 
for the influence of Tucker’s treatise was its scholarly articulation 
of the theories of James Madison and the Democratic Republi-
cans—the group who, in 1800, electorally vanquished the nation-
alist party that produced the Alien and Sedition Acts.  It was the 
Federalist Party’s sudden loss of political power that triggered 
President Adams’s last-minute decision to elevate his Secretary 
of State, John Marshall, to Chief Justice of the Supreme Court—
a kind of rearguard action to preserve his party’s nationalist theo-
ries of the Federal Constitution. 
John Marshall was well aware of the constitutional theories 
of his fellow Virginians James Madison and St. George Tucker.  
Indeed, Marshall accepted the basis of their interpretive theory; 
the proper rules of constitutional interpretation depended on the 
nature of the document, and one determined that nature by 
6. Id. (emphasis added).
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considering the document’s origins.  This is why his opinion in 
McCulloch first addresses constitutional origins before articulat-
ing interpretive principles. 
It would have been politically scandalous to directly criticize 
the work of James Madison and his influential “1800 Report on 
the Virginia Resolutions,” and only slightly less scandalous to 
publicly criticize the only broadly accepted constitutional treatise 
in existence at that time, St. George Tucker’s “View of the Con-
stitution.”  Marshall therefore places the federalist compact theo-
ries of Madison and Tucker into the mouth of Maryland’s coun-
sel.  This allowed Marshall to both avoid scandal and avoid 
having to address the fullest and best articulation of compact the-
ory found in the works of the authors themselves.  
Having feigned ignorance regarding Maryland’s reasons for 
raising the issue of constitutional origins, Marshall then presents 
his own “origins story”: 
[The proposed Constitution] was submitted to the people.  
They acted upon it in the only manner in which they can act 
safely, effectively and wisely, on such a subject, by assem-
bling in convention.  It is true, they assembled in their several 
states—and where else should they have assembled? . . .  
[W]hen they act, they act in their states.  But the measures
they adopt do not, on that account, cease to be the measures
of the people themselves, or become the measures of the state
governments . . . .  The government proceeds directly from 
the people; is “ordained and established,” in the name of the 
people; . . . .  The government of the Union then (whatever 
may be the influence of this fact on the case), is, emphati-
cally and truly, a government of the people. In form, and in 
substance, it emanates from them.  Its powers are granted by 
them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their 
benefit.7 
By characterizing the adoption of the Constitution as an act 
of the singular people of the United States (who just happen to 
assemble in individual states), Marshall sought to avoid the inter-
pretive implications of compact theory.  Since the Constitution 
did not emanate from the many sovereign peoples of the several 
states, it need not be interpreted in a manner preserving the 
7. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 403-05 (1819) (emphasis added).
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retained powers and rights of these independent sovereignties.  In-
stead, the Constitution “emanates” from the national people and 
the powers of the government created by the document must be 
empowered to fully advance the needs and interests of the na-
tional people.  After all, Marshall declares, the national govern-
ment was a “government of all; its powers are delegated by all; it 
represents all, and acts for all.” 8 
Marshall’s opening gambit to reshape the story of our con-
stitutional origins is the key to everything that follows in his opin-
ion.  Under compact theory, the federalist nature of the document 
required that all delegated powers (whether express or implied) 
be strictly construed.  Under Marshall’s nationalist theory of the 
Constitution, the nationalist nature of the document required a 
rule of construction that effectuated its nationalist purpose.  In 
what is probably the greatest act of interpretive chutzpa in Amer-
ican history, Marshall claimed that the language of the Tenth 
Amendment supports a nationalist interpretation of federal 
power:   
[T]here is no phrase in the instrument which, like the articles
of confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers; and
which requires that everything granted shall be expressly and
minutely described.  Even the 10th amendment, which was
framed for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies
which had been excited, omits the word “expressly,” and de-
clares only, that the powers “not delegated to the United
States, nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states
or to the people;” thus leaving the question, whether the par-
ticular power which may become the subject of contest, has
been delegated to the one government, or prohibited to the
other, to depend on a fair construction of the whole instru-
ment.9
Putting aside the issue whether the people insisting upon and 
the ratifying the Tenth Amendment believed they were just “qui-
eting” their own “excessive jealousies,” Marshall’s emphasis on 
what is omitted from the Tenth Amendment altogether ignores 
what is in the Tenth Amendment—an inescapable declaration that 
we have a federalist Constitution.  In his “View of the 
8. Id. at 405.
9. Id. at 406.
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Constitution,” Tucker pointed to both the language of the Ninth 
and Tenth Amendments as jointly calling for a rule of strict con-
struction.10  Marshall’s rule of nationalist construction dismisses 
the significance of the Tenth and ignores the Ninth altogether. 
In his book, Schwartz tries to persuade the reader that 
McCulloch is not an “aggressively nationalist” opinion.  When 
viewed in the historical context in which it was first handed down, 
however, it is clear that McCulloch was radically nationalist.  
Marshall sought to displace (indeed, up-end) what had been the 
dominant theory of the Constitution since the election of 1800, 
and which was articulated in the deeply influential writings of 
James Madison. 
When McCulloch was handed down, Madison immediately 
recognized Marshall’s effort to rewrite history and transform the 
nature of the Federal Constitution.  In his posthumously published 
“Detached Memoranda,” Madison wrote that the “reasoning of 
Supreme C[our]t [in McCulloch v. Maryland was] founded on er-
roneous views.”11  It was not that Madison objected to the Court 
allowing Congress to charter a Bank—Madison himself had ac-
cepted that the “force of precedents” were in favor of the bank.12  
Instead, it was the reasoning employed by Marshall in McCulloch 
that Madison found “erroneous.”  Madison singled out for partic-
ular criticism Marshall’s account of “the ratification of Const[itu-
tion],” and his claim that “the people” was a term “meant . . . col-
lectively [and] not by States.”13  
Madison was not alone in objecting to the reasoning in 
McCulloch.  As Schwartz points out, Marshall quickly found him-
self having to defend his opinion in Virginia newspapers.  More 
than a decade later, Marshall’s protégé, Joseph Story, was still 
defending Marshall’s effort to bury the compact theory of the 
Constitution.  Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution (1833) 
contains multiple passages expressly criticizing the dual sover-
eignty theories of St. George Tucker and James Madison, and 
10. Tucker, supra note 2, at 151.
11. James Madison, Detached Memoranda, 1819?, in JAMES MADISON WRITINGS 745,
756 (Jack N. Rakove ed., Library of Am. 1999). 
12. Id.
13. Id.
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emphasizing what Story viewed as Marshall’s persuasive nation-
alist reasoning in McCulloch v. Maryland.  
By the time of the Civil War, however, northern Republicans 
had come to embrace both John Marshall and James Madison.  
Schwartz notes that Marshall and McCulloch enjoyed something 
of a resurgence in the North during Reconstruction, with Repub-
licans citing Marshall’s opinions as authority for an indissoluble 
Union.  What Schwartz does not mention, however, is that James 
Madison and the Federalist Papers were held in (at least) equally 
high regard by northern constitutionalists.  Civil War and Recon-
struction Republicans generally distinguished the constitutional 
federalism of James Madison from the secessionist theories of 
John C. Calhoun.  Indeed, northern abolitionists embraced Madi-
son’s “Virginia Resolution” and his “Report of 1800” as justify-
ing state-level resistance to slavery.14  The man who drafted most 
of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, John Bingham, 
was especially committed to the ideals of Madisonian federalism 
and limited construction of congressional power.  Bingham, for 
example, insisted that neither Section Two of the Thirteenth 
Amendment nor any other delegated power could be properly 
construed to authorize the 1866 Civil Rights Act.15  According to 
Bingham, federal authority to pass civil rights legislation required 
the addition of a new amendment.  Bingham prevailed, and the 
country got the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Although John Marshall’s reverse-Tenth Amendment read-
ing of national power ultimately became the darling of the New 
Deal Court, Marshall’s account of our constitutional origins has 
never been particularly convincing.  When the Rehnquist Court 
restored the idea of limited construction of federal power, it also 
restored a more historically plausible account of the Constitution 
as emanating from the still sovereign people of the several states.  
True, the Constitution brought into being a national people 
14. See In re Booth, 3 Wis. 157, 175-76 (1854); S.J. Res. 4, 12th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis.
1859), reprinted in 1 THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS: ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS (Kurt 
T. Lash ed.) (forthcoming June 2020).
15. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (Mar. 9, 1866) (Speech of Honora-
ble John Bingham, Of Ohio, on The Civil Rights Bill), reprinted in 2 THE RECONSTRUCTION 
AMENDMENTS: ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS (Kurt T. Lash ed., Univ. of Chi. Press) (forthcom-
ing June 2020).  
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(rendering secession unconstitutional), but in doing so it created 
a system of dual sovereignty, a system preserved by the people in 
1868 despite radical Republican efforts to erase American feder-
alism.  
Schwartz is entirely correct that, despite its mythological sta-
tus, the nationalist possibilities of Marshall’s opinion in McCul-
loch v. Maryland have never been fully realized.  Schwartz 
blames this failure, in part at least, on Marshall’s sometimes am-
biguous language.  But equal blame must fall on Marshall’s effort 
to spin a myth of his own—the myth of a fully nationalist Found-
ing.  One could, of course, argue that Madison and Tucker were 
spinning myths when they described the Constitution as a dual-
federalist compact.  Nevertheless, in the case McCulloch v. Mad-
ison, it is Madison’s vision that informs the opinions of the mod-
ern Supreme Court.  
Schwartz therefore is right to bury the myth of McCulloch.  
But in doing so, we should recognize McCulloch for what it 
was—a failed effort to bury the federalist interpretive theories of 
James Madison and reinvent the nature and origins of the Ameri-
can Constitution. 
